



INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL FOUNDATION

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Pictured above are Professor Padmasiri de Silva (left), PWPA-Sri Lanka President, and Mr. A.C.S. Hameed, Sri Lanka Foreign Minister, upon publication of *"Two Concepts of Peace,"* the inaugural publication of PWPA-Sri Lanka.

Conference on apartheid draws mixed members

"Ideas Have Consequences: An Examination of the Concept of Apartheid," a PWPA conference held in March, 1986 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a rare dialogue on apartheid.

The 30 participants included conservatives and liberals, Africaners and Europeans, Indians, whites and blacks.

Panos Bardis, University of Toledo, USA, presented the keynote address:

"Apartheid, Monocritics, and the Philosophy of Consequentialism." Among the other papers presented were: "On the Possibility of Dialogue Between South Africa and the Rest of Africa," by G. Edward Njock, University of Yaounde, Cameroon; "A State Without a Nation: Alternative Strategies for Change," by Kivuto Ndeti, Nairobi, Kenya; and "Capital-

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Congress marks Soviet anniversary

By Jane Zacek
Rockefeller Inst. of Government

On February 25, 1986, the XXVII Congress of The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CSPU) opened in the Kremlin's modernistic Palace of the Congresses.

The date marked the 30th anniversary of Nikita Krushchev's "secret speech" denouncing Stalin to the Soviet delegates gathered for the Party's XX Congress (foreign delegates were excluded from the late evening session). Never published in the Soviet Union, but circulated for discussion to Party organizations throughout the country and to the East European Communist Parties (CPs), the speech soon reached the West and was published initially in the United States by the U.S. State Department. In it, Krushchev denounced Stalin's dictatorial rule that brought on the great purges of the 1930s and the needlessly enormous losses (20 million people) that the USSR suffered as a consequence of World War II.

Krushchev's speech, which ushered in the expansion of the de-Stalinization policy in Soviet domestic and international affairs, had a profound effect on Soviet society and on those who were coming of age politically in the 1950s.

Mikhail Gorbachev, named General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in March 1985, upon the death

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of Konstantin Chernenko, is of that generation.

Born in 1931, he joined the party in 1952, less than a year before Stalin's death and at a time when a new major purge was getting underway, halted only by Stalin's death in March, 1953.

Well educated (a degree with distinction from the Law Faculty of prestigious Moscow State University and additional training in agricultural affairs, which stood him in good stead when he served as CPSU Central Committee Secretary in charge of agriculture in the late 1970s), knowledgeable about Western management techniques, Gorbachev has developed unusually good organizational skills and professional competencies. Although he was only ten when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 and, therefore, must have only a dim memory of the horrors of the purge period (and none of the hardships of forced agricultural collectivization, 1929-33), Gorbachev lost his father during the war and lived under German occupation for part of that period. His recollections of postwar suffering and the last years of Stalin's rule undoubtedly have had some impact on his political attitudes and political leadership style.

Very substantial personnel changes have occurred in the Soviet Union since the last Party Congress was held in March, 1981. At that time, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary since October, 1964, but in prolonged ill health, was still in office. Because of Brezhnev's long tenure and declining health as well as his adamant refusal to retire longtime Politburo and Central Committee members and permit younger, better trained, more capable people to move into positions of authority, very little of consequence occurred at the Congress or in its aftermath. Only those who were clearly too ill to work at all (or even show up occasionally at the office) or who had actually died were removed from leading Party and state posts. Not surprisingly, substantial policy initiatives

were not adopted either in the domestic or foreign policy arenas. Probably the last significant policy undertaking was the decision to invade Afghanistan in late 1979, with all the negative consequences that have ensued.

In the past five years, since the last Congress, the Soviet Union has had three leaders in rapid succession. Brezhnev died in November 1982 and was succeeded by Yuri Andropov, longtime head of the Committee of State Security (KGB or secret police) and more recently had been the central committee secretary in charge of ideological matters. Andropov, seriously ill for most of his short tenure, died in February 1984, and was succeeded in turn by one of Brezhnev's closest henchmen, the 73-year-old Chernenko.

Inexperienced in everything but Party matters and close association with Brezhnev, Chernenko could not have been expected to initiate any bold policy moves, and he did not. Moreover he, too, was seriously ill (with emphysema) during his brief tenure. Finally, upon Chernenko's not unexpected demise in early March 1985, Gorbachev was selected to serve as General Secretary.

During the early 1980s, several longtime Party leaders finally died, including Aleksei Kosygin, who had served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1964; Mikhail Suslov, Party ideologist and Politburo member since 1955 (who died in early 1982); and Dmitri Ustinov, Minister of Defense and expert on military industrial matters (in 1984). Inexplicably, Kosygin had been replaced by Nikolai Tikhonov, 74 when he took office. Ustinov was succeeded by 73-year-old Marshal Sergei Sokolov.

Since Gorbachev acceded to office, he has moved quickly both to consolidate his power and to retire the Brezhnev generation of leaders as quickly as possible. Less than four months after he was named General Secretary, he engineered the 'promotion' of longtime (since 1957) Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a position popularly but erroneously entitled "President of the USSR" in the West.

The appointment of Eduard Shevardnadze, First Secretary of the Georgian

CP Central Committee and a non-Russian, was indeed a surprise. Informed Western observers believe that Shevardnadze was selected, despite his obvious lack of foreign policy expertise and experience, because he has built a reputation as a good manager, a person who gets things done and who is able to bring rationality and efficiency of operation to a large bureaucracy.

At the same time, Gorbachev "retired" Grigorii Romanov, his leading rival in the Politburo, "for health reasons." If Romanov needed to retire for reasons of health, which no one believes, it would only be for chronic alcoholism, a disease from which many of his colleagues also suffer.

In September 1985, Tikhonov was replaced as Chairman of the Council of Ministers by Nikolai Ryzhkov, a 55-year-old Party functionary who had been a Central Committee Secretary.

During the past year, too, a remarkable number of provincial Party secretaries have been replaced, as well as a number of republic Party first secretaries. Many of the leaders who have been retired are in their 70s, and had been confirmed in their positions at least 10 years ago or more. These regional personnel changes meant there was an extraordinary turnover of Central Committee members.

Not since 1961, when Krushchev decreed just before the Party's XXII Congress that there be a substantial turnover in Central Committee membership at regular intervals, was there such an influx of new members and exiting of the old.

Aside from the massive and important personnel changes, the Party Congress had other important items on its agenda to consider. The 12th five-year plan was also approved. In contrast to the five-year plans of the Brezhnev period, this one called for less attention to agricultural problems and more attention to economic re-organization and plant autonomy in decision-making. Still, it does not seem to focus on some of the most important domestic issues that the regime currently faces.

The USSR has experienced, over the past decade, a period of declining economic growth. Its rate of growth has slowed in part because of overcentral-

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The Impact of Apartheid on Black Family Life

“**T**he South African problem can be reduced to the question of race and domination of one group over the other,” said Mandla Tashabalala of the University of Cape Town’s School of Social Work. Tashabalala delivered a paper, “The Impact of Apartheid Policies on Black Family Life,” at the PWPA conference held in March, 1986, in Johannesburg, South Africa.

“There is no way one can address South Africa’s problem and exclude the issues of race and domination,” Tashabalala said in his paper. “The statement that ideas have consequences,” he said, “becomes pertinent when we examine the effects of the apartheid concept and its resulting policies on all peoples of this country.”

All efforts outside government sponsorship which try to bring about social changes in South Africa are viewed by the State and its machinery as illegal and, therefore, constitute a political offense, he said.

The migratory labor system has adversely impacted African family life, especially in the gold and diamond mines. Black African males are seen as supplying the commodity of labor, not as individual human beings. Labor is recruited from the ‘homelands,’ leaving

wives and children behind. The hostels and compounds for migrant workers are designed without regard for the family or conjugal needs, while husbands can only return to their families at the conclusion of their contracts.

The effect of this system is twofold. The authority and respect for the husband as head of household is undermined since he is absent for much of the time. It leads to breakdown of the family and the establishment of matriarchal households. The other consequence is poverty, since the designated homelands are usually dry, barren lands which cannot be effectively used for a comprehensive agricultural endeavor. Women and children till the soil for subsistence, while the meager savings the husband brings home after working in the white economy is inadequate to provide for family needs.

In the cities, the pattern of employing women as live-in domestics has also weakened family life, since the employer controls the terms of the woman’s relationship with her husband and children. The resulting stresses lead to husbandless and fatherless families with unsupervised children, while the children find little in their parents after which to model themselves.

Under present-day conditions, con-

cludes Tashabalala, the husband-wife relationship is very much influenced by the socio-economic factors operating in the wider community. In traditional Africa, the husband was the protector and provider for his family. Custom prescribed that he be respected and made to feel important. The capitalist system has compelled both husband and wife to sell their labor, thus affecting their relations as man and wife.

From the onset, black/white relationships were characterized by domination and submission, which turned the colonizing man into a slave-driver and the indigenous man into an instrument of production.

‘Peace’ is topic

“The Struggle Over ‘Peace’ ” was the title of a two-day conference sponsored by The Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, held Oct. 1-2, 1986 at The Sheraton Grand in Washington, D.C.

The conference focused on issues concerning the Soviet Union, Central America, ‘peace’ propaganda, and Western security. Panel topics included “The Issue of Moral Equivalence Between the Superpowers;” “Peace Plan or Ploy: Is Gorbachev’s Plan to Eliminate All Nuclear Arms by the End of the Century a Peace Initiative of Historic Significance?” “Strategic Defense and Western Security;” “Central America in the Struggle for Peace;” “Democratic Vulnerability to the Soviet ‘Peace’ War Propaganda, Active Measures and Disinformation;” and “Coping with the Soviet ‘Peace’ War.”

Guest speakers included Malcom Toon, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, and John Tower, former U.S. Senator and U.S. negotiator for the Strategic and Nuclear Arms Talks in Geneva.

Dr. William R. Kintner, professor emeritus at the University of Pennsylvania, was conference chairman.

(From page 1.)

ism Versus Apartheid in the People’s Republic of South Africa,” by Christie Davis, University of Reading, U.K.

PWPA considers apartheid to be a divisive policy which spawns fear, resentment and violence, said Gordon Anderson, Secretary General of PWPA. In a statement issued September 18, 1984, the Reverend Chung Hwan Kwak, chairman of PWPA’s board of directors, said, “By its very nature, apartheid is a teaching and practice which works against the interests of peace. It must be condemned.”

However, said Anderson, PWPA has striven to bring about non-violent solutions, recognizing that much of the

violence given attention by the news media stems from organizations which use the apartheid issue to pursue their own ideological goals or designs of power.

Reverend Kwak has further stated: “The manipulation of resentment of black Africans for the purpose of dividing and conquering is also condemned as it is not in the interests of the unification of Africa . . . The PWPA conference should serve as a catalyst to break down barriers like the doctrine of apartheid, and the resentments and fears it has spawned.”

The South African PWPA meeting was an effort to fulfill this mandate, said Anderson.





Education for the 21st Century

Way to a Better Future in the Middle East

This page, clockwise from bottom right: Moutsopoulos (Greek) recites French poem at final banquet; Vaknin (Israeli); Sofroniou (Cypriot); Kepir, Gulek (Turks); El Ahwal (Egyptian). Facing page, clockwise from bottom right: El Hachems enjoy final banquet; Ben-Dak (Israeli); Ibrahim (Egyptian, chair); Dr. and Mrs. Agapitides (Greek); Barbara Ibrahim (American); Moutsopoulos (Greek).





The Role of Religion in Lebanese Society

The cultural and religious plurality, which has become the hallmark of Lebanon, is supported by the concept of personal status, reinforced by the country's various educational institutions, said Bassam El Hachem, professor of religious sociology at the Institute of Social Sciences, Lebanese University in Beirut.

Dr. El Hachem presented his paper, "Education and Personal Status in a Multi-Religious Society: The Case of Lebanon," at the PWPA conference "Education for the 21st Century," held in Istanbul Jan. 31-Feb. 4, 1986.

Professor El Hachem outlined the role religious or confessional adherence plays in the over-all make-up of Lebanese society.

"Lebanon, with its population of approximately 2,500,000 inhabitants, comprised of 11 Christian, four Muslim and a Druze confession, with tiny minorities of Sephardic Jews and Bahai, offers a unique example of a culturally pluralistic society," he said.

The country is actually made up of communities of adherents, according to El Hachem. The communities possess religious institutions which play roles exceeding their purely religious ones, influencing judicial structure, schools and universities, real estate holdings and employment patterns. This is true not only in rural towns and villages, but also in the major cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Zahle and Sidon, in which the urban sector, the quarter and the street have replaced the provincial region, the village and the village quarter.

"The different Lebanese communities cooperate but without intimate contact; they frequent each other but without social integration," he said.

The main Christian and Muslim communities share the highest state functions: the presidency, cabinet president and chamber of representatives. Civil service jobs are shared according to a quota system. The communities often have their political parties and para-

military organizations as well as their own international relations, media and unified political stances.

The state of separation, introversion and partitioning which still characterizes these communities is the result of age-old conflict and persecution between Muslims and Muslims, Christians and Christians, and Muslims and Christians. The Middle East has been the arena of these conflicts since the dawn of the Islamic empire; the Lebanese communities still retain traces of them in their very blood and in their relations with each other, said El Hachem.

Societal segmentation in Lebanon has been fostered primarily by personal status, as defined by the legal codes of the various religions or confessions, and reinforced by the schools. Under the Ottoman regime, non-Muslim minorities were granted autonomy in the private matters and schools under the authority of their religious leaders. The main Muslim communities as well as the Druze community also had separate schools but were governed by the Islamic *sharia* according to the Hanafite doctrine. Since the founding of the state of Lebanon, the Shi'ite and Druze communities have broken away from the Sunnites by acquiring their own personal status, founded for the Shi'ites on the *Ja-farite* inter-

pretation of the *sharia* and for the Druze on the *Hanafisme*, adapted to the fundamental teachings of their religion.

The personal statuses, established in the name of basic religious dogma and doctrine, integrate from the inside and separate from the outside. The different personal statuses in Lebanon are responsible for etching out human frontiers between communities, which are separated by no geographic boundaries.

Confessional schools, which represent 61.9 percent of private schools and 27.5 percent of all schools in Lebanon and which are attended by 38 percent of all pupils in Lebanon, have been shown by several studies to contribute to the reinforcement of the pupil's feeling of belonging to his community. Furthermore, in the absence of a well-defined state educational policy and governmental control to ensure its application, the educational vacuum is filled by other 'educational' groups: the family, club, newspaper, priest or sheikh, the charitable organization or political party. Schools, family and environment combine to preserve differences.

Thus, the combination of different personal statuses, reinforced by education, produce societal segmentation as well as cultural pluralism in Lebanon.

Mid-East Conference:

"Education for the 21st Century"

The PWPA conference, "Education for the 21st Century: The Way to a Better Future in the Middle East," held January 31 through February 4, 1986 in Istanbul, Turkey, is paving the way for further dialogues on mid-East issues.

The Istanbul conference had a total of 30 participants from 12 countries of the mid-East and was chaired by Dr. Adnan Badran, the president of Yar-

mouk University in Jordan.

Over the three days of the conference, participants discussed various issues relating to education, including social evolution, financing higher education, conflict regulation, computer and satellite utilization, the impact of Westernization and women in education.

Thomas Cromwell, secretary-general

(Continued on next page.)

for PWPA in the Middle East, commented, "Through these conferences, we are steadily building up a core of committed people who are willing to put in real effort to see PWPA achieve success in the Middle East. Incredibly, we are attracting some of the region's best minds."

A series of conference proposals has been generated by PWPA's activities in the mid-East. Among these is an "Inter-Communal Dialogue on Lebanon's Future," to be held during spring, 1987, in Cyprus. This conference centers on the premise that Lebanon is entering a new stage of a peace brokered by Syria and accepted by the Lebanese communities out of a need to achieve peace at almost any cost. The dialogue among Christian, Shi'ite, Sunni and Druze representatives of the Lebanese communities would address such questions as how to create a national consensus essential for rebuilding the nation and what opportunities the new peace might offer.

A Greek-Turkish dialogue was held in September, 1986 in Istanbul. The theme of the dialogue was the discussion of areas for developing international economic, technical and cultural cooperation in the east Mediterranean. Since Greece and Turkey are NATO partners who struggle over long-standing problems such as the Cyprus issue and the dispute over rights in the Aegean, on-going discussions through PWPA are aimed at reducing tensions and creating an atmosphere conducive to peaceful resolution of conflict between these two neighbors.

PWPA is also working to establish a committee for the preservation of the cultural heritage of the east Mediterranean. Committee membership would be equally divided between Greeks and Turks, with the especial aim of restoring the Hagia Sofia in Istanbul, the most sacred of Greek Orthodox monuments, and the repair of Muslim religious buildings in Greece, especially mosques in Thrace. The project was agreed upon at the Greek-Turkish dialogue in September.

PWPA's Mid-East regional conference is slated for January, 1987 in Istanbul and will focus on "Agriculture and Food Production in the Middle East."

PWPA Conferences in 1986

Jan. 31-Feb. 4	<i>Education for the 21st Century</i>	Istanbul, Turkey
Feb. 23-26	<i>Economic Development of Malaysia</i>	Pukhet, Thailand
Mar. 21-23	<i>Ideas Have Consequences</i>	Sandton, South Africa
April 3-6	<i>Religion, State and Society</i>	England
May	<i>The Role of Academics</i>	Kandy, Sri Lanka
May	<i>Education, Employment, Welfare</i>	Dhaka, Bangladesh
May 2-3	<i>Psychobiology for Peace</i>	Sevilla, Spain
May	<i>Development in Africa</i>	Nigeria
May 30-Jun. 1	<i>The Open Society, A Guarantee</i>	Oslo, Norway
June	<i>Ethnicity and African Development</i>	Kisantu, Zaire
June	<i>The Effects of the Drought</i>	Dakar, Senegal
June 12	<i>Social Changes and Peace in Haiti</i>	Port-au-Prince, Haiti
June 20	<i>World Peace in Nepalese Perspective</i>	Kathmandu, Nepal
July 5-6	<i>Evaluation & Impact of Aquino Phenomenon</i>	Manila, Philippines
July 5-8	<i>Development Through Self-Reliance in S.A.D.C.C. Region</i>	Lusaka, Zambia
July 15-17	<i>Problem of Peace in Africa: Relation to World Peace</i>	Burkina Faso
July 15-18	<i>16th ICWP: New Discovery of Asia</i>	Seoul, Korea
July 23-26	<i>Employment, Peace & Development</i>	Ogun State, Nigeria
Summer	<i>Dialogue on Lebanon's Future</i>	Cyprus
August	<i>National PWPA Meeting</i>	Montevideo, Uruguay
August 8-9	<i>The Aquino Phenomenon II</i>	Manila, Philippines
August	<i>Peace and the Crisis of Value</i>	Bogota, Colombia
August 20	<i>The International Year of Peace</i>	Paramaribo, Suriname
Sept. 6-7	<i>Greek-Turkish Dialogue</i>	Istanbul, Turkey
Sept. 13-15	<i>The Gorbachev Generation</i>	USA
September	<i>Economics, Politics, Culture . . .</i>	Italy
September	<i>The Future University in Europe</i>	Austria
Sept. 20-21	<i>Science and Ethics</i>	Netherlands
Oct. 30-Nov. 2	<i>Spain Facing the XXI Century</i>	Malaga, Spain
Oct. 3-4	<i>Work and Spirituality</i>	Canada
Dec. 8-10	<i>Food Production and Agricultural Policies in Africa</i>	Togo
Dec. 18	<i>Day of New Cultural Revolution</i>	Washington, D.C.

From page two: *Congress marks Soviet anniversary*

ized planning, problems of enforced full or near-full employment, which translates into too many people doing too little work at the plant or office, and the maturing of the economy.

These problems will be compounded by the dramatic fall in international oil prices (the world's leading oil producers).

At the same time, despite the rhetoric and enhanced budgetary attention to declining agricultural output for the past several decades, the country has suffered a series of poor harvests, and has had to spend too much of its hard-earned currency to buy grain and livestock fodder abroad. Less attention to the agricultural sector, and a smaller share of the budgetary pie allocated to agriculture surely will not improve the situation in the countryside or on urban grocery shelves. Reports over the past several years of very limited quantities of meat and fresh vegetables, which the population has not suffered lightly, do not auger well.

There are other serious domestic problems as well, that the regime has not yet confronted, but will need to attend to in the very near future. One is the unprecedented decline in male life expectancy; a second is the concurrent rise in the number of infant mortalities. The USSR is the only developed country in which these two biostatistical trends are known to exist. While there has been no official commentary in the Soviet press, even in the specialized medical journals, Western observers believe that these trends are the result of the declining quality of medical care as well as the continuing chronic alcoholism problem that the country has experienced for many centuries.

Recent reports by Western observers state that many 18-year-old Soviet army recruits come with childhood diseases (measles, mumps, smallpox) that have been virtually eliminated through vaccines and shots in the west. These young men seem not to have been inoculated as youngsters. Why not? In crowded living conditions, especially in large urban areas, a high

percentage of the population, including children, suffers from repeated and continuing respiratory ailments. Doctors refuse to inoculate youngsters for fear they will be unable to ward off the temporary illnesses such shots produce.

Another serious problem the regime faces is that of the changing demographic situation. While the birth rate has declined markedly in the Slavic (western) regions of the country, it remains high (average family size: 5-7 persons) in the non-Slavic Central Asian regions. Not only has this situation alarmed the Russian-dominated leadership because it suggests that the Russian component of the population will decline to less than 50 percent by the turn of the century, but there is also the growing problem of population maldistribution.

The areas of the country in which unskilled labor is increasingly abundant are precisely those areas where additional labor is not needed. Rather, the newly-developing industrial areas of central and eastern Siberia and the continuing industrial development in the western parts of the country are labor-scarce.

The few efforts to date to entice Central Asians to western Russia and to eastern Siberia have not been successful. Central Asians have felt alien and discriminated against, and have opted to return to their native regions as quickly as possible. The regime will have to begin to deal with the population/workforce problem very soon, and it will not be easy to resolve.

On the foreign policy front, there are a number of issues outstanding from the Brezhnev years. Relations with the U.S., including arms control negotiations, continue to head the list.

There are clear indications that Gorbachev is anxious to improve relations with the People's Republic of China, as well as with Japan, with whom the Soviets have yet to conclude a peace treaty formally ending World War II. The Soviets may also be seriously considering a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In Eastern Europe, the situation remains

grave and will probably get worse. Poland remains volatile, although relations between the regime and Solidarity, on the one hand, and the Catholic Church on the other have calmed somewhat in recent months. Aging leadership in Czechoslovakia (reports persist that Party leader Gustav Husak is positively senile), Hungary (popular party leader Janos Kadar, in office since the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, is now in his late 70s) and Rumania (Ceaurescu, while only in his 60s, may soon face rising popular discontent as the regime continues to permit the poorest standard of living in Eastern Europe after Albania) mandate major personnel changes soon. Presumably, the Soviet leadership will want to play some role in the selection of successors to these leaders who may be expected to retire or expire in the near future.

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